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THE NOT SO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
Shon Hopwood *
Abstract: The Speedy Trial Act (STA) of 1974 occupies a peculiar place in the criminal
justice system. Very few pieces of legislation can lay claim to protecting both the rights of
criminal defendants and the public’s significant interest in timely justice, while reducing the
cost of judicial administration. The STA formerly accomplished these lofty aims by reducing
pretrial delays. But for the past two decades legal scholars have ignored the STA, and both
prosecutors and defense attorneys have subverted the STA’s goals by routinely moving for
continuances. And although the Act categorically applies in every federal criminal case, it
has been effectively marginalized by federal district and circuit courts. The reason this
happens is simple: no actor in the criminal justice system has an incentive to follow it.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike rely on delays in the system; and overburdened
district courts, which have opposed the STA since its inception, have failed to enforce it as
written. Appellate courts, too, prefer to thwart the STA’s requirements rather than reverse a
conviction obtained by otherwise constitutional means. The institutional inertia that pulls
courts away from the STA’s commands has led to a predictable result: an increase in pretrial
delays, the very ill that Congress intended to cure when it passed the Act. This Article
highlights and examines the ways in which federal courts undermine the STA and details a
number of open circuit court conflicts involving the Act. The Article then proposes a
comprehensive, but non-Congressional, fix that prescribes how every actor in the criminal
justice system can comply with the Act as Congress intended.
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INTRODUCTION
It is an idea as old, if not older, than Magna Carta: “justice delayed is
justice denied.” 1 That principle is a vital component of any equitable
system of criminal justice. It is vital for a reason: delays in justice are
destructive to defendants’ rights and to the public good. 2 For this reason,
Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 3 (STA or Act) to reduce
delays between a criminal defendant’s arraignment and trial. Congress
believed the STA would protect the public’s significant interest in timely
justice, both as a matter of fairness and as a way to reduce the financial
burden of judicial administration. 4
Given the enormous public interest involved in speedy trials, one
would think that federal trial and appellate courts would follow the strict
structures of the Act; 5 those structures were designed precisely to

1. See MAGNA CARTA cl. 40 (1215), translation reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at
461 (2d ed. 1992) (“[T]o no one will we deny or delay right or justice.”); United States v. Wilson,
27 C.M.R. 472, 477 (1959) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“From the historic day at Runnymede, in
1215, when the English barons exacted the Magna Carta from King John, a guiding principle in
English, and later American, jurisprudence has been that justice delayed is justice denied.”). The
quote “justice delayed is justice denied” has been attributed to the British Statesman William E.
Gladstone. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 312 (Fred R. Schapiro ed., 2006).
2. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (1976).
4. S. REP. NO. 96-212, at 6–7 (1979).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012).
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prevent pretrial delays and the concomitant weakening and expense of
the federal criminal justice system. 6 Although the STA has now been in
place for over thirty years, federal courts continue, whether through
inadvertence or intention, to skirt its statutory text and purpose. Lower
federal courts also routinely flout the Supreme Court’s repeated
admonishments that courts must abide by the STA as it is written—
without adding judicial gloss.7 Twice the Supreme Court has
admonished lower courts not to impose their own extra-textual
limitations onto the Act. Yet, as will be shown in Parts III through V,
lower federal courts have failed to heed the Court’s commands. The
frequency of these end-runs around the STA are problematic because
they lead to unreasonable delays in criminal cases which, in turn, create
a detriment to criminal defendants and to the public interest.
So what can be done? This Article argues that the legal academy,
lawyers, and federal courts at all levels can ensure—through scholarship,
advocacy, and statutory interpretation—that the Act’s text and central
purpose are faithfully followed, and consequently, that unacceptably
long pretrial delays will be an anomaly and not the growing norm. Part I
summarizes the interests animating the STA, how it operates, and the
judiciary’s initial response to it. The next four Parts cover specific STA
issues. Part II highlights how district courts continue to disregard the
Supreme Court’s decision about when STA rights can be waived by
criminal defendants. Part III details how lower courts continue to
undermine the STA through erroneous interpretations and applications
of the ends-of-justice provision. Parts IV and V discuss how federal
courts mistakenly apply the doctrines of judicial estoppel and ineffective
assistance of counsel to claims implicating the STA. And Part VI
explains the reasons why courts undermine the STA and provides a
comprehensive approach for resolving such problems so far as they
affect every actor in the criminal justice system, from defense attorneys
to the legal academy, to the courts.
Then Assistant Attorney General (and later Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court) William H. Rehnquist, may have said it
best—or at least most directly—when he considered the solution to

6. The speedy trial legislation achieved three goals simultaneously: it strengthened public safety
while at the same time lowering costs and protecting the rights of criminal defendants. See SUSAN
N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 205 (2006); Richard S. Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 667, 668–69 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 213 (2010); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S.
489, 502 (2006).
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pretrial delays in federal courts. He declared, “[I]t may well be . . . . that
the whole system of federal criminal justice needs to be shaken by the
scruff of its neck, and brought up short with a relatively peremptory
instruction to prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges alike that
criminal cases must be tried within a particular period of time.” 8 That
boldness indicated severity of the problem. The lingering question,
however, was what, if anything, was to be done about the problem of
justice delayed?
I.

UNACCEPTABLE DELAY

A.

The Interests Animating the Speedy Trial Act and the Judiciary’s
Initial Response

The right to a speedy trial has roots going back to the Magna Carta. 9
From those early roots it began to sprout in the colonial Bill of Rights
where George Mason wrote that “a man has a right . . . to speedy trial.” 10
The right was considered so essential that in the early period of our
history, several states guaranteed a speedy trial in their bill of rights.11
Not only does the right occupy a precious position in the Sixth
Amendment today, but it also shares space in all fifty State
Constitutions. 12 And the Supreme Court has labeled the right
“fundamental” and “one of the most basic rights preserved by our
Constitution.” 13
But while the speedy trial right’s importance was undeniable,
Congress had recognized by the mid-1970s that the right required some
teeth in order to prevent the considerable pretrial delays that plagued
federal courts. 14 Congress noted that “both the defense and the
prosecution rely upon delay as a tactic in the trial of criminal cases,” 15
and that those delays had a “detrimental effect on the rights of

8. Speedy Trial: Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 107 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y
Gen. of the United States), reprinted in A. PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 226–27 (Fed. Judicial Center 1980).
9. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
10. See Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776).
11. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225.
12. Id. at 225–26.
13. Id. at 226.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7407.
15. Id. at 7407–08.
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defendants.” 16
Congress, however, was not just concerned with the effect of pretrial
delays on defendants’ rights but also with how those delays impacted the
public interest. Such delays are dangerous within the criminal justice
system because a testifying witness’ memory may fade with the passage
of time. 17 Delays further weaken the system by creating large backlogs
of cases, enabling criminal defendants to better negotiate for lenient plea
bargains that lead to substantial sentencing disparities for defendants
who commit similar crimes. 18 In cases where the defendant is granted
bail, long pretrial delays create a tempting opportunity for the defendant
to escape from the charging jurisdiction or commit new crimes. 19 If that
were not enough, pretrial delays erode the public’s confidence in the
criminal justice system20 and burden the government with additional
costs that are ultimately borne by taxpayers. 21
Recognizing the sizeable dangers that delays pose to the public
interest and acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had not provided “adequate
guidance” 22 to lower courts, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to
“give real meaning” to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial 23 and “to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by
requiring speedy trials.” 24
Although Congress recognized the negative effects of pretrial delays
as a significant problem, 25 the STA engendered significant opposition
from the courts. 26 The Judicial Conference of the United States opposed
16. Id. at 7407.
17. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
18. Id. at 519.
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N at 7409.
20. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501 (2006).
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N at 7408–09 (pretrial delays
“create[ ] a financial as well as an administrative burden on the taxpayer”); AMANDA PETTERUTI &
NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., JAILING COMMUNITIES: THE IMPACT OF JAIL
EXPANSIONS AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 18 (2008), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-04_REP_JailingCommunities_AC.pdf (noting that
the average daily cost to the county of incarcerating one pretrial detainee is $58.64, for a minimum
of $21,403 if pretrial detention lasts a year).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N at 7405.
23. Id. at 7404.
24. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076.
25. See STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Approved Draft 1968); John C. Godbold, Speedy Trial—Major Surgery for a
National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265 (1972).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 96-390, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805, 808 (1979) (“[B]oth the
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the bill and asked the Congress to postpone its enactment until the
judiciary could first evaluate the effectiveness of its rules in reducing
pretrial delays. 27 After Congress passed the Act anyway, thirteen district
courts recommended that it be repealed.28 Other criticisms were voiced
in the case law. 29
Perhaps the most significant judicial opposition centered on the
STA’s district court reporting requirements, 30 which mandated that each
district court convene a planning group “responsible for the initial
formulation of all district plans.” 31 The STA required district court
clerks to assemble speedy trial information, including statistics on the
number and length of delays. 32 That information, the Act stated, was to
be made available to the Circuit Council and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, 33 the latter of which must then submit
periodic reports to Congress based on this information. 34 Many district
courts nevertheless failed to comply with the reporting requirements. 35
B.

The Speedy Trial Act

The Speedy Trial Act “sets forth a basic rule” that a defendant must
be tried within seventy days of indictment or the date the defendant first
appears in court, whichever is later. 36 But not every pretrial day counts
toward the seventy-day total. Rather, the STA “excludes” eight
categories of time from the speedy trial calculation; 37 only seventy days
of nonexcludable time triggers a STA violation. If a defendant is not
Department of Justice and the Judicial Conference opposed enactment of the legislation in 1974,
and information available to the committee leads us to the conclusion that, 5 years later, opposition
within the Justice Department and the courts has not entirely withered away.”).
27. Letter from Rowland F. Kirks, Dir. of the Admin. Office of the United States Courts, to the
Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 8, 1974), reprinted in
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7446.
28. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 52 (1980).
29. See United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1977); United States v.
Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. Robert L. Misner, District Court Compliance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1, 15–25 (1977).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3168(a) (Supp. IV 1976).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
33. Id. § 3170(c).
34. Id. § 3167.
35. Misner, supra note 30, at 25 nn.117–19.
36. United States v. Tinklenberg, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2011 (2011).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012).
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tried within the requisite period and the defendant timely files a motion
to dismiss, 38 a court must dismiss the indictment, with or without
prejudice. 39
Section 3161(h)(1) is littered with eight enumerated subcategories of
time that are excludable. 40 Those subcategories include delay resulting
from: issues involving the defendant’s mental incompetency, 41
interlocutory appeals, 42 the filing of pretrial motions and their
consideration by the court, 43 transferring a case or the removal of
defendants from another district; 44 transporting defendants from other
districts or from hospitalization; 45 and consideration by the court of
proposed plea agreements. 46 While this may seem like an abundance of
exceptions, all but one—the exception for pretrial motions—do not
apply in the run-of-the-mill criminal case.
The part of the Act that is routinely employed, and that provides
district courts with a level of flexibility, is the ends-of-justice
continuance. That provision excludes any delay resulting from a
continuance where a judge concludes “the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.” 47
But just because a judge grants an ends-of-justice continuance does
not mean the continuance automatically constitutes excludable time
under the Act; no such period of delay is excludable “unless the court
sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons
for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trial.” 48 To put it differently, under the Act it is not enough
for a court to merely cite to the ends-of-justice provision; instead, a court
must state its reasons on the record as to why granting a continuance is
in the best interest of the public and the defendant. This is an important

38. Id. § 3162(a)(2).
39. Under the Act, district courts possess discretion to dismiss the indictment with or without
prejudice. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 333 (1988).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H).
41. Id. § 3161(h)(1).
42. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(C).
43. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D) & (h)(1)(H).
44. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(E).
45. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
46. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(G).
47. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
48. Id.

06 - Hopwood_Final Author Review_Hopwood edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:50 PM

716

[Vol. 89:709

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

statutory feature that this Article will highlight in detail below. 49
Among the factors that a district court must consider in deciding
whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance are a defendant’s need
for reasonable time to obtain counsel, continuity of counsel, and
effective preparation of counsel. 50 Conversely, courts are altogether
barred from granting ends-of-justice continuances “because of general
congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the attorney for the
Government.” 51 The ends-of-justice provision thus grants courts
substantial flexibility to continue trials, yet it nevertheless limits that
flexibility by providing procedural safeguards that courts must satisfy
before such a continuance will comply with the Act.
II.

WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL ACT RIGHTS

Lower federal courts have found that, just like most legal rights,
defendants can waive their right to a speedy trial.52 The question has
become when waiver is appropriate. In Zedner v. United States, 53 the
Supreme Court largely answered that question.
The case began when the government indicted the defendant in April
of 1996. The district court granted several ends-of-justice continuances 54
before the defendant requested a continuance of his own. Prior to
granting the defendant’s continuance, the court instructed the defendant
to sign a preprinted waiver form and waive his speedy trial rights “for all
time,” 55 which the defendant promptly did. A few months later, the court
granted yet another continuance, so that defendant could attempt to
authenticate evidence the prosecution planned to present at trial.56 In
granting the last continuance, the court made no finding that the ends of
justice outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial as required by the STA. In fact, the court made no mention
of the Act, 57 and yet the continuances totaled four years of delays

49. See infra text accompanying notes 79–88.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
51. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(C).
52. See United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pringle, 751
F.2d 419, 434–35 (1st Cir. 1984).
53. 547 U.S. 489 (2006).
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id. at 494.
56. Id. at 495.
57. Id.
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between indictment and trial.58 When the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment, the court denied it on grounds that defendant had
waived his speedy trial rights. The defendant was ultimately convicted
and the Second Circuit affirmed. 59
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Samuel Alito first considered
whether a defendant might prospectively waive the application of the
Act. Looking to the text of the statute, Justice Alito noted that § 3161(h)
contains no provision providing for prospective waivers, and this
omission by Congress, he concluded, “was a considered one.” 60 Justice
Alito next emphasized that a waiver would run counter to one of the
Act’s core purposes: safeguarding the public interest “by, among other
things, reducing defendants’ opportunity to commit crimes while on
pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial delay from impairing
the deterrent effect of punishment.” 61 To allow prospective waivers
would seriously undercut the Act, Justice Alito explained, “because
there are many cases . . . in which the prosecution, the defense, and the
court would all be happy to opt out of the Act, to the detriment of the
public interest.” 62 The Court went on to hold that defendants can waive
the Act’s application by failing to file a timely motion to dismiss prior to
the start of trial. 63
Although the Zedner Court in 2006 unambiguously held that criminal
defendants are unable to prospectively waive their rights under the Act, 64
defense lawyers continue to assert broad, open-ended speedy-trial
waivers on behalf of their clients, 65 and district courts continue to accept
those waivers. 66
58. Id.
59. Id. at 495–96.
60. Id. at 500.
61. Id. at 501.
62. Id. at 502.
63. Id. at 502–03 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(2)).
64. Id. at 506.
65. Wildwood Partners sent me motions to waive Speedy Trial Act rights filed by criminal
defense lawyers, post-Zedner, in the following federal districts: Middle District of Florida; Southern
District of Florida; District of Nevada; Central District of California; Northern District of Indiana;
and the District of Oregon. See E-mail from Wildwood Partners to author (Dec. 22, 2012, 15:48
PST) (on file with author).
66. E.g., Reid v. United States, 871 F. Supp. 2d 324, 336 (D. Del. 2012) (noting that the district
court granted defendant’s multiple waivers of STA rights); United States v. Beals, 755 F. Supp. 2d
757, 760 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (granting waiver, but in ruling on a motion to dismiss the court
recognized that STA rights cannot be waived); United States v. Reddick, CRIM. 09-MJ-2001 JS,
2010 WL 5253527 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2010) (holding that defense counsel had authority to waive
STA rights for defendant, even where defendant desired a speedy trial); United States v. Dean,
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The district court in United States v. Gates, 67 for example, faced a
motion to dismiss after the court had accepted the defendant’s waiver of
speedy-trial rights and granted a number of continuances. The defendant
argued that because he had not agreed to his defense counsel’s request
for continuances, the time that elapsed from those continuances did not
constitute excludable time and thus his STA rights were violated. 68 The
court rejected the defendant’s argument in part “because waiver of
speedy trial rights may be made by the lawyer without the knowledge of
the defendant.” 69 Conspicuously absent from the court’s discussion was
mention of Zedner’s holding that the STA does not allow prospective
waivers, let alone prospective waivers made by counsel without notice to
the defendant.
Another way that district courts circumvent Zedner is by converting
waivers of STA rights into ends-of-justice continuances months after the
court has granted the waivers. In Reid v. United States, 70 a defendant
argued that his lawyer committed ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to file a motion to dismiss under the STA. 71 The district court
acknowledged that it had granted the defendant’s waiver, but the court
still found that it had cited the ends-of-justice provision in granting the
waiver and continuing the trial for fifteen months. 72 The court therefore
concluded that the continuance was based on the ends-of-justice
provision and not the waiver. 73
Retroactively converting waivers into ends-of-justice continuances is
no less an anathema to Zedner than is a prospective waiver. Zedner itself
forbids such a move: “We see little difference between granting a
defendant’s request for a continuance in exchange for a promise not to
move for dismissal and permitting a prospective waiver.” 74 At least one
district court, the District of the District of Columbia, has explicitly
rejected the argument that a court may conceal a mistakenly granted

3:05CR25/LAC, 2010 WL 3958673 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010) report and recommendation adopted,
3:05CR25/LAC, 2010 WL 3958668 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2010) (granting defendant’s waiver of STA
rights and finding no STA violation, in part, because of defendant’s waiver).
67. 650 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D. Me. 2009).
68. Id. at 84.
69. Id. at 85.
70. 871 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Del. 2012).
71. Id. at 336.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 505 (2006).
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waiver by converting it into an ends-of-justice continuance. 75
Lastly, one entire federal district continued to accept STA waivers
long after Zedner. The Southern District of Florida continued, by local
rule, to allow district courts to accept waivers of STA rights by
defendants, and the district did not change its local rule until 2011, five
years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zedner. 76
Seven years after the Zedner Court unanimously held that defendants
may not opt out of the Act by waiving speedy trial rights, defense
lawyers continue to file waiver motions and district courts continue to
grant broad waivers, which, almost always, result in lengthy delays. This
is precisely the result the Supreme Court meant to prevent.
III. THE ENDS-OF-JUSTICE CONTINUANCE
As noted above, district courts employ the ends-of-justice
continuance to delay trials for reasons such as defendant’s need for
reasonable time to obtain counsel, continuity of counsel, and effective
preparation of counsel. 77 Because the ends-of-justice continuance
provides district courts with flexibility and a degree of subjectivity about
the need for pretrial delays, the continuance has been one of the most
frequently abused provisions of the STA.
A.

The Need to Provide On-the-Record Reasons for Ends-of-Justice
Continuances

The STA provides in unmistakable language that a district court must
make a finding that the ends of justice are warranted before a
continuance under § 3161(h)(7) counts as excludable time. A district
court must also “se[t] forth, in the record of the case, [] its reasons” for
finding that the ends of justice outweigh other interests. 78
The Zedner Court noted that the Act’s procedural requirements (i.e.,
ends-of-justice findings and placing reasons on the record) serve an
important purpose:
The exclusion of delay resulting from an ends-of-justice
continuance is the most open-ended type of exclusion
recognized under the Act and, in allowing district courts to grant

75. See United States v. Ferguson, 574 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2008).
76. See S.D. FLA. CT. R. 88.5, Comments (2011) (“Amended [in 2011] to eliminate authority of
Court to accept a waiver of Speedy Trial rights.” (citing Zedner, 547 U.S. 489)).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).
78. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
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such continuances, Congress clearly meant to give district
judges a measure of flexibility in accommodating unusual,
complex, and difficult cases. But it is equally clear that
Congress, knowing that the many sound grounds for granting
ends-of-justice continuances could not be rigidly structured, saw
a danger that such continuances could get out of hand and
subvert the Act’s detailed scheme. The strategy of
§ 3161(h)([7]), then, is to counteract substantive open-endedness
with procedural strictness. This provision demands on-therecord findings and specifies in some detail certain factors that a
judge must consider in making those findings. 79
So what constitutes valid reasons? The Court in Zedner held that the
Act was not satisfied by the trial court’s mere “passing reference to the
case’s complexity” in its ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss. 80 The
D.C. Circuit has taken that to mean that implicit findings are not
enough. 81 If passing references to the listed factors and implicit findings
do not suffice, it is likely that courts must generate genuine reasons as to
why a continuance should be granted and then place those reasons on the
record. 82
It is not an exaggeration to say that district courts have given short
shrift to the STA’s requirement of providing on-the-record reasons to
justify ends-of-justice continuances. One way that courts pretend to
comply with the Act is by granting the requested continuance and
signing an order stating that the ends of justice outweigh the interests of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, even though the court does
not actually make such a finding or provide reasons for the finding on
the record. 83 Some courts have also cited the ends-of-justice provision in
minute orders with no indication as to how the ends-of-justice provision
applies to the case at hand. 84 These courts appear to believe that saying
79. Zedner, 574 U.S. at 508–09.
80. Id. at 507.
81. See United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that “implicit”
findings are insufficient to invoke the ends-of-justice exclusion).
82. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 210 (2010) (“Subsection (h)(7) provides that
delays ‘resulting from a continuance granted by any judge’ may be excluded, but only if the judge
finds that ‘the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial’ and records those findings.” (emphasis in original)).
83. See, e.g., Order at 1, United States v. Anderson, No. 5:09-cr-34-Oc-10GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct.
20, 2009).
84. E.g., Minutes of Court, United States v. Gearhart, No. 4:06-cr-40004 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007),
ECF No. 114; Minutes of Court, United States v. Gearhart, No. 4:06-cr-40004 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 31,
2007), ECF No. 119; Minutes of Court, United States v. Gearhart, No. 4:06-cr-40004 (S.D. Ill. Apr.
19, 2007), ECF No. 144; Minutes of Court, United States v. Gearhart, No. 4:06-cr-40004 (S.D. Ill.
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the magic words “ends-of-justice” and citing to the United States Code
are valid substitutes for making real findings and providing those
findings on the record.
Another way that courts avoid providing on-the-record reasons is
through the use of a check-the-box form. These courts employ an “Order
of Excludable Delay” form that provides a list of common excludable
time provisions that can be used to justify a delay. One court in
particular, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, uses this type of form, and when it grants an ends-ofjustice continuance, the court checks a box labeled: “Continuance
granted in the interest of justice.” 85 That is it. No other reasons are
provided, other than a simple check in a box citing to the ends-of-justice
provision. Once again, merely citing to the ends-of-justice provision
alone is not enough. 86
A number of district courts employ a different means for granting
ends-of-justice continuances without providing on-the-record findings.
These courts state no reasons at all because they understand that their
circuit courts will infer the reasons from the context, i.e., from the
reasons provided by the parties in a motion to continue. 87 The standard
of review that allows reviewing courts to infer reasons from context will
be addressed in the next section.
Congress, through the enactment of the ends-of-justice provision,
sought to allow judicial flexibility combined with uniformity; but above
all else, Congress sought certainty: the certainty that an ends-of-justice
continuance was indispensable to protect the public interest and the
defendant’s rights, and the certainty that a judge would place that fact on
the record for the public, defendant, and reviewing courts to see and
scrutinize. But the courts described above thwart Congressional design
by acting as if the on-the-record reasoning requirement is a nice
May 3, 2007), ECF No. 150; Minutes of Court, United States v. Gearhart, No. 4:06-cr-40004 (S.D.
Ill. July 9, 2007), ECF No. 185 (minute orders granting continuances, stating that continuances
would serve the “ends of justice” but with no indication of the factors employed in the ends of
justice determination).
85. See Order of Excludable Delay, United States v. Brown, No. 1:10cr10101-RGS (D. Mass.
Jan. 20, 2011).
86. See United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A record consisting of
only short, conclusory statements lacking in detail is insufficient.”); Bryant, 523 F.3d at 360
(holding that a “passing reference to the ‘interest of justice’ made by the trial judge at the . . . status
hearing does not indicate that the judge seriously considered the ‘certain factors’ that
§ 3161(h)(7)(A) specifies” and the time period is therefore not excluded).
87. See United States v. Levis, 488 F. App’x 481 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S.
Ct. 2020 (2013); United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
133 S. Ct. 1581 (2013).
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suggestion, or something that can be satisfied by a routine check in a
box, as opposed to an authoritative command requiring actual reasoning
and analysis. These courts are wrong.
B.

Finding Reasons from Context Instead of Explicit Findings

Although Zedner made clear that the STA requires “express” findings
before an ends-of-justice continuance counts as excludable time, 88
several circuit courts hold that implied findings are enough. These courts
hold that the STA is satisfied if a reviewing court can gather from
context a conceivable basis upon which the district court possibly
granted the continuance. 89 That context can take many forms, but courts
generally rely on the reasons provided by the parties in the motions to
continue. 90 And one court went so far as to impute to the district court
reasons that would have complied with the STA, all while
acknowledging that the court had failed to set forth such reasons.91
These circuits, in effect, conduct the equivalent of fact-finding, before
concluding that because the record may support ends-of-justice findings,
district courts cannot be faulted for failing to make a finding on the
record. 92
Such decisions undercut the Act’s text, undermine its purposes, and
do major damage to its intended application. To begin with, the STA’s
plain language simply does not allow appellate courts to rely upon the
reasons provided by the parties or upon some amorphous “context”
derived from the lower court proceedings. 93 Rather, the STA states that

88. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006).
89. See, e.g., Wasson, 679 F.3d at 947; United States v. Napadow, 596 F.3d 398, 405 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Edelkind, 525
F.3d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Thomas, 272 F. App’x 479, 484 (6th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 782–83 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d
796, 803 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 1989).
90. Wasson, 679 F.3d at 947.
91. United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction and
holding that since “this case is facially and actually complex,” the ends-of-justice continuance
satisfies the STA, “even if the district court did not explicitly state as much when granting the
continuance”).
92. Currently, there is a circuit split on the question of whether explicit findings are needed.
Compare Wasson, 679 F.3d at 938, with United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1206–07 (10th Cir.
2010) (implicit findings not enough); United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268, 1269 (9th Cir.
1997) (same); United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States
v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176
(9th Cir. 2010) (same).
93. Wasson, 679 F.3d at 947.
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“the court”—meaning the trial court—must set forth “its reasons.” 94
Congress, of course, could have said that the parties, reviewing courts,
or even the trial court’s deputy clerk can make the ends-of-justice
finding and place the reasons for that finding on the record. 95 But this it
did not do. As with the other features of the STA, “this omission was a
considered one.” 96
Nor does the STA allow appellate courts to rely on implied findings.
The STA specifically states that “[n]o such period of delay resulting
from [an ends-of-justice] continuance granted by the court . . . shall be
excludable” unless a district court “sets forth” its reasons “in the
record.” 97 The STA thus conditions ends-of-justice continuances upon
certain findings before such a continuance counts as excludable time. 98
This was the Zedner Court’s understanding when it concluded that the
Act requires express findings and also that a district court’s “passing
reference to the case’s complexity” did not suffice. 99 When a reviewing
court, in effect, finds and provides the ends-of-justice reasons for a trial
judge, it renders the second sentence of § 3161(h)(7) “insignificant, if
not wholly superfluous,” 100 destroying the procedure that Congress
intended.
Congress, in fact, had a specific purpose in mind when it required the
particular procedure that courts place express reasons on the record.
Congress wanted to ensure that a district judge would give careful
consideration when balancing the need for delay against the interest of
the defendant and of society in achieving a speedy trial. 101 Congress also
added the requirement to provide appellate courts with an adequate
record to review. 102 Without a well-defined record, appellate courts are
left to guess as to the reasons a trial court felt the need to grant a
continuance, and holding trial courts’ feet to the fire by requiring express
findings eliminates that guesswork.
Congress expected that ends-of-justice continuances would be needed

94. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (2012).
95. See United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 385 (3d Cir. 1981) (“We think the statutory
language strongly suggests that Congress intended the trial judge, not his deputy clerk, to decide
whether to grant a continuance.”).
96. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500 (2006).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
98. United States v. Tinklenberg, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2019 (2011).
99. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507.
100. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
101. S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 41 (1974).
102. Id.
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to provide trial courts with flexibility, but it also believed such
continuances would be a “rarely used” tool, employed only after a court
balanced the competing interests and provided on-the-record findings. 103
Contrary to this expectation, circuit courts have approved delays of
several years 104 without explicit findings from trial courts stating the
reasons why such significant delays were needed in the first place.
C.

Open-Ended Continuances

Despite the Congressional belief that the ends-of-justice continuances
would be a highly circumscribed and rarely used process, several courts
of appeals have held that trial courts may grant open-ended ends-ofjustice continuances. The First Circuit allows open-ended continuances,
reasoning that while “it is generally preferable to limit a continuance to a
definite period for the sake of clarity and certainty,” it is still
“inevitable” that a trial court will need to grant a continuance “without
knowing exactly how long the reasons supporting the continuance will
remain valid.” 105 The Fifth Circuit, too, permits open-ended
continuances where “it is impossible, or at least quite difficult for the
parties or the court to gauge the necessary length of an otherwise
justified continuance.” 106 And some circuits add one proviso: a
reasonableness requirement. The Third Circuit will permit open-ended
continuances as long as “they are reasonable in length.” 107 Other circuits
have followed suit. 108
103. S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 39–41 (1974), reprinted in A. PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
at 163 n.108 (Fed. Judicial Center 1980).
104. United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S.
Ct. 1581 (2013).
105. United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 508 (1st Cir. 1984).
106. United States v Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that a five month open-ended continuance
was not unreasonable and collecting cases to support the finding).
107. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir. 1992).
108. United States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1065 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e will follow the rule of
the First, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that open-ended ends-of-justice continuances for
reasonable time periods are permissible in cases where it is not possible to preferably set specific
ending dates.”), amended on other grounds en banc, 307 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1458 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We agree with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits
that, while it is preferable to set a specific ending date for a continuance, there will be rare cases
where that is not possible, and an open-ended continuance for a reasonable time period is
permissible.”). But see United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that
by granting an open-ended continuance for complexity, a district court “risks having the exclusion
used ‘either as a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the requirements of the
Speedy Trial Act’” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 829 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“The Speedy Trial Act and its amendments are the product of a series of delicate
OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974,
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Open-ended continuances are potentially the device most destructive
to the STA’s goals. With such continuances there is a grave danger that
courts will commit an end-run around the Act by granting one long endsof-justice continuance. Allowing a continuance for an uncertain period
of time also “would dissociate the period of exclusion from the specific
delay which occasioned the exclusion.” 109 The Supreme Court in Zedner
was unwilling to allow a defendant to waive STA rights for all time
given the great public interest at stake in speedy trials; open-ended
continuances perform the very same harm to that public interest as a
prospective waiver does.
Open-ended continuances also seem contrary to the STA’s statutory
language. For one, the STA commands that once a defendant is charged
with an offense, a trial court shall, “at the earliest practicable time,” set
the case for trial “so as to assure a speedy trial.” 110 But a judge who
orders an open-ended continuance is by definition not setting a case for
trial. Additionally, a trial judge must, for “[a]ny period of delay,” set
forth reasons for each “such continuance.” 111 The STA thus seems to
indicate that if a trial judge needs additional time for delay, the proper
procedure would be to order several continuances limited to a particular
period of time with additional findings provided for each such
continuance. 112
If a trial court is unable to know when a trial can take place, the
solution is not to grant an open-ended continuance at the beginning of
the case that lasts until the court or the parties decide on an appropriate
trial date. The better solution, and the one most consistent with the STA,
is for a court to grant, say, a seventy-day continuance at the end of which
the court could reconsider whether an additional continuance is
necessary. Such a procedure is less likely to subvert the important public
interest in speedy trials because it would force courts to examine
legislative compromises. . . . This delicate balance could be seriously distorted if a district court
were able to make a single, open-ended ends of justice determination early in a case, which would
‘exempt the entire case from the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act altogether.’” (internal
quotation omitted)); United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990) (open-ended endsof-justice continuances impermissible); United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir.
1984) (same).
109. Pollock, 726 F.2d at 1461.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (2012).
111. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
112. Jordan, 915 F.2d at 565–66 (holding that to prevent “one early ‘ends of justice’ continuance
[from] exempt[ing] the entire case from the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act altogether,” the
district court must provide for each continuance “findings supported by the record”); Gambino, 59
F.3d at 358 (“The length of an exclusion for complexity must be not only limited in time, but also
reasonably related to the actual needs of the case.”).
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whether further delays are warranted—rather than ignoring the STA’s
requirements altogether, which is what occurs when courts grant openended continuances.
Although the STA provides that in the ideal case a trial should
commence no later than seventy days after indictment or arraignment,
the circuit courts have approved considerably longer delays resulting
from open-ended continuances. In Sabino, the Sixth Circuit approved a
350-day continuance. 113 In Lattany, the Third Circuit upheld a 425-day
continuance, 114 and in Rush, the First Circuit approved an approximately
540-day open-ended continuance. 115 The judicial approval of these
lengthy delays provokes the question whether the STA’s commands are
actually taken seriously.
D.

Non-Contemporaneous Ends-of-Justice Findings

The Speedy Trial Act does not explicitly address the timing for when
a district court must put forth its reasons on the record. But the statute
does state that an ends-of-justice finding will not count as excludable
time unless the court sets forth “reasons for finding that the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 116 Some courts
have taken this to mean that a judge cannot grant an ends-of-justice
continuance absent these findings only to then create them retroactively
at a later date. 117 Or, to put it differently, while ends-of-justice findings
“may be entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after
the fact.” 118
The Supreme Court in Zedner added to the uncertainty as to when the

113. 274 F.3d at 1063.
114. 982 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir. 1992).
115. 738 F.2d 496, 506 (1st Cir. 1984).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Crane, 776 F.2d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A district judge cannot
wipe out violations of the Speedy Trial Act after they have occurred by making the findings that
would have justified granting an excludable delay continuance before the delay occurred.”
(quotation omitted)); United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Carey, 746 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that “retroactive continuances that are made after
expiration of [speedy trial clock] for reasons the judge did not consider before lapse of the allowable
time are inconsistent with the Act”); United States v. Frey, 735 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that “the district court erred by making nunc pro tunc findings to accommodate its
unwitting violation of the Act”); United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208, 216 (6th Cir. 1984)
(reversing because the “district court cannot fairly be said to have granted the continuance . . . based
on the findings that it set forth” nearly a month later).
118. United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original).
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findings must be set forth:
Although the Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only
in the judge’s mind, before granting the continuance (the
continuance can only be “granted . . . on the basis of [the
court’s] findings”), the Act is ambiguous on precisely when
those findings must be “se[t] forth, in the record of the case.”
However this ambiguity is resolved, at the very least the Act
implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time
a district court rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under
§ 3162(a)(2). 119
The Court also noted that the “best practice, of course, is for a district
court to put its findings on the record at or near the time when it grants
the continuance.” 120
Seizing upon this permissive language from Zedner, courts have taken
the invitation to delay setting forth ends-of-justice findings on the record
until defendants have filed motions to dismiss. The procedures used in
United States v. Smith 121 illustrate this paradigm of STA procedure.
There, the district court granted a continuance on October 25, 2005, but
failed to make an ends-of-justice finding. 122 Almost a year later, the
court “memorialized” its ends-of-justice findings. 123 Acknowledging that
such a procedure was not ideal, the court nevertheless concluded that a
late ends-of-justice finding was acceptable, even though by the time the
court “memorialized” it’s finding, the seventy-day STA time limit had
long since expired. 124 This retroactive memorializing of findings is a
common way for courts to justify ends-of-justice continuances, and other
courts routinely employ the same maneuvers. 125
In contrast, there are very few cases where a district court confesses a
failure to make an ends-of-justice finding when asked by the government
to memorialize its prior findings. 126 Facing a motion to dismiss the
119. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 506–07 (2006).
120. Id. at 507 n.7.
121. No. 05-cr-30133-07-DRH, 2007 WL 118123 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2007).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding district
court’s reasons provided only after a motion to dismiss was filed); United States v. Sain, No. 2:08
CR 214, 2010 WL 2776185, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2010); United States v. Allen, No. 06-4005601-SAC, 2008 WL 4511035, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2008); United States v. Hardimon, No.
2:07-CR-47 PPS-PRC-17, 2008 WL 141511, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2008); United States v.
Mudd, No. 1:06CR-57-R, 2007 WL 2815841, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2007).
126. I could only find two examples of this phenomenon: United States v. Estrada, No. 08-CR-
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indictment in United States v. Estrada, 127 District Judge J.P.
Stadtmueller of the Eastern District of Wisconsin could have simply
created findings and claimed that they were made when the court
granted the ends-of-justice continuance. Instead, Judge Stadtmueller
admitted that to do so “would confuse validly granted continuances
which are later substantiated during the speedy trial time period with
retroactive continuances forbidden under the Act.” 128 Other courts have
not been so forthcoming. 129
Allowing district courts to wait until a motion to dismiss is filed
before providing on-the-record reasons is problematic. As noted, very
few judges have the wherewithal to acknowledge that they failed to
make a proper record of reasons for granting a continuance by the time a
defendant moves for dismissal. 130 Delayed record making thus invites
abuse. 131
There are also practical reasons judges should not postpone providing
on-the-record findings. In some districts, it is a magistrate judge who
grants the continuance but a district court that rules on the motion to
dismiss. In these cases, a district court would need to either infer the
reasons or provide the reasons after the fact—a procedure several
circuits prohibit. 132 Another problematic scenario occurs when the judge
has not provided reasons on the record and, by the time the motion to
dismiss is filed, the judge can no longer provide the reasons due to death
or disability. 133
Finally, there is an even better reason district courts should not delay
in providing on-the-record reasons. Trials that do not take place within
seventy days must be dismissed, and unless a period of time is
excludable, once the seventy days is up, a defendant can move for
231, 2011 WL 1696262 (E.D. Wis. May 4, 2011) and United States v. Shanahan, No. 04-cr-126-04PB, 2007 WL 2332727, at *4–5 (D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2007).
127. No. 08-CR-231, 2011 WL 1696262 (E.D. Wis. May 4, 2011).
128. Id. at *6.
129. See supra note 125.
130. See supra note 121.
131. See United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 544–45 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If the judge gives no
indication that a continuance was granted upon a balancing of the factors specified by the Speedy
Trial Act until asked to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Act, the danger is great that every
continuance will be converted retroactively into a continuance creating excludable time, which is
clearly not the intent of the Act.”).
132. See supra note 90.
133. Cf. United States v. Tomkins, No. 07 CR 227, 2011 WL 4840949, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12,
2011) (“Finally, the Court notes the obvious difficulty in a second judge deciphering the
circumstances—including the mindset of the previously assigned judge—at the time that a prior
continuance was granted.”).
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dismissal. 134 Although a judge has the power to grant a continuance at
any time, a continuance does not become an ends-of-justice continuance,
and thus count as excludable time, until the judge sets forth reasons on
the record. 135 A judge who waits until after the seventy days have passed
without providing on-the-record reasons, therefore, runs the risk, under
the plain language of the statute, that the indictment must be
dismissed. 136 Indeed, this was the understanding of the Congress when it
passed the STA. 137
IV. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
In Zedner, the Supreme Court, for a time, stopped circuit courts from
employing a broad form of judicial estoppel with every defendant who
requested a continuance and then later challenged a district court’s
decision to grant the continuance. The Government had argued in
Zedner that since defendant’s waiver had led the district court to grant a
continuance without making an ends-of-justice finding, the defendant’s
speedy trial claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 138
Under that doctrine, when a party assumes a certain position in a legal
proceeding and that position is successful, the party may not put forth a
contrary position in another legal proceeding, especially if it prejudices
the other party. 139
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, noted that in order for judicial
estoppel to apply, the defendant’s current position had to be “clearly
inconsistent” with its prior position in the district court.140 Justice Alito
then noted that there were three possible positions that the defendant

134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(c)(1), 3161(h), 3162(a)(2) (2012).
135. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
136. See United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that trial
judges can delay articulating their on-the-record reasons for granting the continuance if those
reasons are entered before the Act’s seventy-day limit would have otherwise expired).
137. S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 39–41 (1974), reprinted in A. PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 161 (Fed. Judicial Center 1980) (“[T]he new
provision allows a judge to grant a continuance only where he finds that the ‘ends of justice’
outweigh the best interest of the public and the best interest of the defendant in speedy trial. This
means that in each case where a continuance is requested, . . . the judge must determine before
granting the continuance that society’s interest in meeting the ‘ends of justice’ outweighs the
interest of the defendant and of society in achieving speedy trial. Furthermore the judge must set out
in writing his reasons for believing that in granting the continuance he strikes the proper balance
between these two societal interests.”).
138. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 503 (2006).
139. Id. at 504 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)).
140. Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001)).
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could have taken in the district court: 1) defendant’s promise not to
move for dismissal on STA grounds; 2) defendant’s implied position
waiving his STA rights; and 3) defendant’s claim that his counsel
needed additional time to research the authenticity of certain bonds that
would be used as evidence at trial. 141
Though Justice Alito did not explicitly rule out applying judicial
estoppel to claims under the Act, he did find that under any of the three
positions, estoppel did not apply. 142 Justice Alito expressly declined to
apply a broad application of estoppel for to do so “would entirely
swallow the Act’s no-waiver policy.” 143 Additionally, even though
defendant requested a continuance on the basis of defense counsel’s
need to authenticate evidence of bonds, the Court found that estoppel
was not applicable because the district court never addressed that reason
in granting the continuance. 144 For this reason, defendant’s position at
the continuance hearing was not “clearly inconsistent” with his position
that the district court failed to comply with the Act’s requirements for an
ends-of-justice continuance. 145
Justice Alito, however, did provide an escape hatch for circuit courts
looking to bar defendants that move for continuances from later
challenging them. He stated:
This would be a different case if petitioner had succeeded in
persuading the District Court at the January 31 status conference
that the factual predicate for a statutorily authorized exclusion of
delay could be established—for example, if defense counsel had
obtained a continuance only by falsely representing that he was
in the midst of working with an expert who might authenticate
the bonds. 146
Clutching to this language, one circuit has held that judicial estoppel
applies to STA claims, and another circuit is poised to do the same in the
appropriate case. In Pakala the First Circuit concluded that since the
defendant moved for an ends-of-justice continuance and the trial court
accepted his reasons for the continuance, the defendant could not later
challenge the continuance on the ground that the trial court failed to set
forth its reasons on the record. 147 In doing so, the First Circuit had to
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505.
568 F.3d 47, 60 (1st Cir. 2009).
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dismiss the fact that even though the trial court may have relied on
Pakala’s reasons for needing a continuance, the court failed to set forth
those reasons on the record. 148 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit stated that
although it was reserving judgment on the question, it believed that a
defendant who asked for one continuance and did not contest a
government-requested continuance had a clearly inconsistent position in
later challenging those continuances on appeal. 149
So when exactly did the Zedner Court intend for judicial estoppel to
apply? To answer that question it is important to clarify the two types of
challenges to ends-of-justice continuances under the STA. First, a
defendant can challenge whether a district court complied with the
STA’s procedural requirements (i.e., when a court fails to make findings
and set them forth on the record). 150 As with any question of legal error,
appeals courts review such challenges de novo. 151 Second, a defendant
can challenge the sufficiency or merits of the trial judge’s reasons, but to
prevail the defendant must establish an abuse of discretion. 152 In this
second type of challenge, a defendant can argue that a trial court granted
an ends-of-justice continuance for an improper reason, such as “general
congestion of the court’s calendar.” 153 The defendant in Pakala, for
example, challenged the district court’s failure to comply with the Act’s
requirement of making express findings on the record (a procedural
challenge). 154 The defendant did not challenge the district court’s
reasons for granting the continuance (a merits challenge), because again,
the district court failed to provide reasons.
This distinction between procedure and merits goes to the heart of the
question of when judicial estoppel applies. Judicial estoppel could apply,
as the Pakala court held, anytime a defendant successfully requests a

148. Id. (“[W]e stress that the far better course for the district court would have been to articulate
its reasons for granting the ‘ends of justice’ continuances.”).
149. United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 948–49 (7th Cir. 2012) (“So although we reserve
judgment on the question of when estoppel prevents a plaintiff from challenging continuances under
the Act, we note that Wasson’s support for the continuances certainly does little to enhance his
position on appeal.”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1581 (2013).
150. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507.
151. See United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 2007)).
152. See United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Jean, 25 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1993)).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C) (2012).
154. United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507
(“Thus, without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under § 3161(h)([7]).”).

06 - Hopwood_Final Author Review_Hopwood edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:50 PM

732

[Vol. 89:709

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

continuance and the defendant later challenges it, no matter the type of
challenge. 155 Or, it could apply when a defendant convinces a trial court
to grant a continuance for a particular reason and the court does so, but
the defendant later argues that the court was wrong in granting the
continuance for that particular reason (a merits challenge).
There are a number of reasons why judicial estoppel should apply to
the latter but not the former. First, if judicial estoppel applied every time
a defendant filed a motion to continue, such a rule would amount to
waiver, which Zedner explicitly forbids. 156 In fact, the Zedner Court
stressed that since the STA is animated by a powerful public-interest
purpose, defendants may not opt out of the Act simply by failing to
assert their rights prior to filing a motion to dismiss.157 For this reason,
some defendants who have filed multiple motions to continue trial have
nonetheless succeeded in challenging a district court’s failure to set forth
proper ends-of-justice findings without running into trouble with the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. 158
Second, contrary to the panel decision in Pakala, the defendant there
did not convince the district court that the factual predicates for an endsof-justice continuance existed. 159 Rather, as the Pakala panel
acknowledged, the district court never provided on the record the
reasons why the continuance was needed; instead, the court merely
stated that the ends of justice were best served by granting a
continuance. 160 And that is the point: a defendant cannot convince a
court to do something it never did.
Third, Pakala’s position at the continuance hearing was not clearly
inconsistent with his position on appeal. At the continuance hearing,
Pakala’s attorney argued that he needed additional time to prepare,
whereas on appeal, he argued that the trial judge failed to make that
finding of additional preparation time and failed to set forth that reason
on the record. 161 The two types of challenges were separate and not
clearly inconsistent.162
155. Pakala, 568 F.3d at 60.
156. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 500 (“If a defendant could simply waive the application of the Act
whenever he or she wanted more time, no defendant would ever need to put [the § 3161(h)(7)]
considerations before the court under the rubric of an ends-of-justice exclusion.”).
157. Id. at 500–01.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1205–07 (10th Cir. 2010).
159. Pakala, 568 F.3d at 60.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Oberoi, 547 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2008) (“As a result, Oberoi’s earlier
position (ignoring the Speedy Trial Act) is not ‘clearly inconsistent’ with his later position
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What the Zedner Court was concerned about was the situation in
which a defendant argues before a trial judge that the case is complex,
the judge makes such a finding, and then the defendant challenges the
judge’s finding of complexity on appeal. 163 What Zedner did not say was
that judicial estoppel applies whenever a defendant requests a
continuance; indeed, it was the defendant who requested the continuance
in Zedner. 164
V.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Because many district courts and defense attorneys ignore the STA,
criminal defendants often raise ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
claims arguing that their attorneys erroneously failed to file a motion to
dismiss on STA grounds. In order to prevail on an IAC claim, a
defendant must establish that: (1) trial counsel’s performance fell below
objective standards for reasonable effective representation (deficient
performance prong); and (2) the lawyer’s errors affected the outcome of
the proceedings (prejudice prong). 165
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Deficient Performance

How district courts cope with IAC claims raising STA deficiencies
largely mirrors how they handle motions to dismiss on STA grounds;
except there is even more reluctance to find an STA violation at the
post-conviction stage, after the judicial system has devoted an enormous
amount of resources into obtaining a conviction. Courts, therefore,
struggle to find that an attorney’s failure to raise an STA claim amounts
to constitutionally deficient performance, even when such a claim has
merit.
Cooper v. United States 166 is one such model of judicial apathy
toward a defense attorney’s failure to follow the Supreme Court’s
commands. In that case, the defendant claimed that his lawyer had

(invoking the Speedy Trial Act).”), vacated, 559 U.S. 999 (2010), and abrogated by Bloate v.
United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010).
163. See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 505 (2006) (“This would be a different case if
petitioner had succeeded in persuading the District Court at the January 31 status conference that the
factual predicate for a statutorily authorized exclusion of delay could be established—for example,
if defense counsel had obtained a continuance only by falsely representing that he was in the midst
of working with an expert who might authenticate the bonds.”).
164. Id.
165. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984).
166. No. 09-162-DRH, 2012 WL 996947 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2012).
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committed ineffective assistance in advising him to sign an STA waiver,
which resulted in lengthy pretrial delays. 167 The court found that
counsel’s performance was not unreasonable because it appeared the
defendant was going to enter into plea negotiations, and “[p]erhaps
[defense counsel] believed that no speedy trial violation had occurred
but he wanted to try and curry favor with the government by filing a
waiver of his speedy trial rights, whether valid or not, as they entered
into plea negotiations.” 168 The court thus concluded that counsel’s
performance in waiving the defendant’s STA rights was not
unreasonable, 169 even though counsel’s performance directly
contravened Zedner. 170
Similarly, in East v. United States, 171 a case decided five years after
Zedner, a district court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to file an
STA motion to dismiss did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court concluded that since East had signed a waiver of
speedy trial rights and the court had granted that waiver, there was no
STA violation, and hence, counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a
meritless motion to dismiss. 172 Other courts have held similarly. 173
In another case, a district court flipped the law on its head in order to
avoid declaring that it or defense counsel was wrong about an STA
issue. In United States v. Smith, 174 a district court acknowledged with the
benefit of decisions from the Tenth Circuit that, “it appears likely that
my open-ended [continuance order] was not sufficient per se to have
warranted a nearly three-year continuance of the trial and that the
significant lapse of time between the filing and resolution of many of the
numerous motions submitted in this case was not entirely excludable
either.” 175 Still the court found no ineffective assistance of counsel
because “[t]he fact that neither defendant’s seasoned co-counsel nor any
167. Id. at *13.
168. Id. at *15.
169. Id.
170. See 547 U.S. 489, 500 (2006).
171. No. 11-3239-CV-S-RED, 2011 WL 5404160 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2011).
172. Id. at *3.
173. See United States v. Gates, 650 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D. Me. 2009) (“In sum, because waiver
of speedy trial rights may be made by the lawyer without the knowledge of the defendant and
because Gates’s previous lawyer did seek the delays in question, Gates’s argument under the
Speedy Trial Act fails.”).
174. Order Denying Michael D. Smith’s Verified 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Habeas Petition to Vacate
Judgment of Conviction and Set Aside Sentence, United States v. Smith, No. 08-cv-01438-REB (D.
Colo. May 26, 2010), ECF No. 1818.
175. Id. at 6 (emphasis in the original).
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of the other able attorneys or, indeed, this court, perceived a speedy trial
issue strongly suggests that the lapse, if such there was, was not outside
the boundaries of competence at the time the case was tried.” 176 Or, to
put it somewhat differently, how can counsel be faulted for providing
unreasonable assistance by missing an STA issue if a supposedly
infallible federal court was unable to spot it?
As these cases demonstrate, courts are hesitant if not downright
hostile to the idea of reversing a conviction based on ineffective
assistance, even where it is plain that the lawyer overlooked or outright
missed a meritorious STA claim. 177
B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Prejudice

A criminal defendant must also establish prejudice in order to succeed
on an IAC claim. 178 To establish Strickland 179 prejudice, a defendant
must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” 180 For ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the
relevant standard is whether there is a reasonably probability that a
defendant would have been acquitted but for counsel’s errors.181
In other contexts, the Strickland prejudice standard adapts to the
proceeding at issue. In Hill v. Lockhart 182 the Supreme Court evaluated a
defendant’s claim that his attorney’s errors led to the imprudent
acceptance of a guilty plea.183 The Court there required the defendant to
show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
[the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” 184 In Evitts v. Lucey 185 the Court concluded that
criminal defendants are guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel on

176. Id.
177. See also United States v. Osborne, No. 4:05CR00109-12 JLH, 2010 WL 5283297, at *8–12
(E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2010) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus no STA violation,
because the nunc pro tunc ends-of-justice continuances “neither rewrote history nor substantially
changed Osborne’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act.”).
178. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 694.
181. Id.
182. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
183. Id. at 57.
184. Id. at 59.
185. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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appeal, 186 and in order to establish prejudice on appeal a defendant must
show that the “omitted issue ‘may have resulted in a reversal of the
conviction, or an order for a new trial.’” 187 The Court has yet to address
the appropriate inquiry when a defendant claims that his lawyer failed to
file a meritorious motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
Several circuits, however, have addressed such claims. The Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Rushin 188 concluded that a defendant could
not establish Strickland prejudice unless he could show that but for his
attorney’s deficient performance the indictment would have been
dismissed with prejudice under STA. 189 In doing so, the court noted that
it would not confine “proceeding” to only the particular indictment at
issue. 190 Instead, the court decided that “proceeding” meant the entire
case, and thus in order to establish Strickland prejudice the defendant
needed to show that the government would be unable to re-indict him. 191
Several other circuits hold the same. 192
But that cannot be right: Strickland prejudice is not synonymous with
establishing that a dismissal with prejudice under the STA would have
occurred. In determining whether the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different absent an attorney’s deficient performance, the
Supreme Court has looked to the particular proceeding at issue, not
whether the entire case must be dismissed never to be retried. The Court
in Glover v. United States 193 considered a sentencing IAC claim, and
there the Court discussed the prejudice inquiry in terms of the particular
proceeding at issue—sentencing, not the entire case. 194 Similarly, the
186. Id. at 396.
187. Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644,
646 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Kitchen v. United States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2000).
188. 642 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1818 (2012).
189. Id. at 1309–10.
190. Id. at 1309.
191. Id. at 1309–10.
192. See, e.g., Chambliss v. United States, 384 F. App’x 897, 899 (11th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Thomas, 305 F. App’x 960, 964 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fowers, 131 F. App’x 5, 6–7
(3d Cir. 2005); Campbell v. United States, 364 F.3d 727, 731 (6th Cir. 2004); Clark v. United
States, Nos. 4:02-cr-17, 4:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3991066, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2012); NamurMontalvo v. United States, No. 1:05-CR-477-16-CC-GGB, 2012 WL 3758152, at *6 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:05-CR-477-16-CC, 2012 WL 3758133 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 28, 2012); United States v. De La Cruz, No. CRIM.2001-10118-JLT, 2012 WL 769761, at
*8 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, CIV.A. 01-10118-JLT, 2012 WL
773617 (D. Mass. Mar. 5, 2012); United States v. Osborne, No. 4:05CR00109-12 JLH, 2010 WL
5283297, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2010).
193. 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
194. Id. at 204.
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Court in Hill considered whether counsel had provided ineffective
assistance at the defendant’s guilty plea proceedings, and in assessing
prejudice, the Court asked whether the defendant would have insisted on
going to trial had counsel been effective. 195 What the Court did not do is
ask whether the defendant would have been found guilty anyway. Even
in a run-of-the-mill trial IAC claim, to prove Strickland prejudice the
defendant must only show there was a reasonable probability of
acquittal, not that the defendant would have been acquitted and that the
government would not have been allowed to retry the defendant 196 The
Court has thus defined proceedings, for Strickland-prejudice purposes, to
the proceeding at issue, not the case as a whole.
Moreover, if a defendant had to show that the entire case would have
to be dismissed with no chance for re-indictment or retrial, then
defendants would rarely, if ever, succeed on appellate ineffective
assistance claims. A defendant would need to show both that the lawyer
failed to raise a meritorious claim that would have resulted in a reversal
on appeal and that the government could not bring a retrial upon
remand. This is something no court has ever required—except, it seems,
in the STA context. And it would be anomalous indeed if a defendant
could prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim due
to a lawyer’s failure to raise a meritorious STA issue on appeal (i.e.,
because counsel’s error affected the appellate proceedings), and yet lose
on a pretrial IAC claim because the defendant was unable to show both
that a motion to dismiss would have been granted and that the
government would be unable to retry the defendant in a new proceeding.
One purpose of an IAC claim is to put the defendant back in the
position one would have occupied had one been represented by
competent counsel. 197 The Supreme Court in fact recently considered a
case where the defense lawyer’s incompetence resulted in the defendant
rejecting a plea bargain. 198 There, the Court said that prejudice can be
shown when the defendant “lose[s] benefits he would have received in
the ordinary course but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.” 199 Applying
that doctrine to the Rushin case, had the defendant there received
effective assistance, his counsel would have filed a motion to dismiss the
195. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
196. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986).
197. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
remedy for counsel’s ineffective assistance “should put the defendant back in the position he would
have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred”).
198. Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1385 (2012).
199. Id. at 1388.
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indictment. Then the court would have ordered dismissal (albeit without
prejudice), and the defendant would have received vindication of his
speedy trial rights regardless of whether the government could have reindicted him.
Even if an indictment is dismissed without prejudice, that is not a
toothless sanction because “it forces the Government to obtain a new
indictment if it decides to reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.” 200 The defendant may also
derive some benefit from a dismissal without prejudice: “the time and
energy that the prosecution must expend in connection with obtaining a
new indictment may be time and energy that the prosecution cannot
devote to the preparation of its case.” 201 And, if the defense lawyer
knows that an STA violation has occurred, the lawyer could use the
threat of dismissal as a bargaining chip with the government. Defendants
who do not receive competent counsel with regard to STA claims,
therefore, miss out on important procedural rights and benefits that the
STA provides.
And by forcing defendants raising STA ineffective assistance claims
to show that their indictment would be dismissed with prejudice, courts
in effect make such claims unwinnable. In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, § 3162(a)(2) requires the
district court to consider each of the following factors: “the seriousness
of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the
dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution . . . on the administration of
justice.” Because it is the rare federal case that does not qualify as a
serious offense, very few federal cases are dismissed with prejudice. 202
Once again, one cannot help but get the feeling that federal circuit
courts are unreceptive if not downright antagonistic to the notion of
reversing a conviction on STA grounds.
VI. SOLUTIONS: THE ACADEMY, ADVOCACY, AND THE
COURTS
A.

Why Is this Happening?
STA violations occur with such regularity because there is no real

200. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 342 (1988).
201. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 503 n.5 (2006).
202. United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 282 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing cases holding that even
nonviolent property crimes are “serious” for STA purposes).
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incentive for anyone to follow the Act. 203 Delay is a federal prosecutor’s
friend. The longer the delay, the greater the chance a prosecutor has to
flip a co-defendant into a cooperating witness through a negotiated plea
deal. Defense attorneys also desire and create delays. Trials take an
enormous amount of preparation, so defense lawyers often will defer
trials as long as possible out of convenience. For those defense lawyers
who bill by the hour or are paid per CJA-appointment, 204 there can be a
direct correlation between delays and larger profits, and as a result,
defense attorneys are sometimes incentivized to create delay. Defense
attorneys may also act as proxies for defendants who wish to delay their
trials as long as possible in order to avoid the consequences of a guilty
verdict.
With increasing federal criminal prosecutions, district court dockets
are teeming with cases, and the courts are ill equipped to monitor pretrial
delays in every case that comes before them. And, as this article has
illustrated, there are few incentives for trial courts to follow the Act
because they can rest assured that their actions will be upheld by
reviewing courts in all but the most egregious abuses. Appellate courts
also prefer to look the other way when it comes to the Act’s
requirements rather than reverse an otherwise error-free conviction.
Because the STA is not a sexy source for scholarship, critical analysis
of the STA’s application is nearly non-existent; the last batch of
scholarship from the legal academy comprehensively covering the STA
occurred in the 1980s. 205 That is a problematic development because
scholarship can often have the effect of calling attention to court
decisions that lack analytical rigor and can act as a check on those
decisions that run contrary to congressional design.
Without probing scholarship, without incentives to prevent delays,
and without judicial fealty to the Act’s text, the STA has been watered
down to the point where it no longer has any taste.

203. See A. PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974,
at 16 (Fed. Judicial Center 1980) (“[W]hile it is in the public interest to have speedy trials, the
parties involved . . . do not feel any pressure to go to trial. The court, defendant, his attorney, and
the prosecutor may have different reasons not to push for trial, but they all have some reason.”
(quoting 120 CONG. REC. 41618 (1974))).
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2012).
205. See, e.g., George S. Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal
Criminal Litigation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50 (1982); Suzanne Isaacson, Speedy Trial Act
of 1974—Dismissal Sanction for Noncompliance with the Act: Defining the Range of District
Courts’ Discretion to Dismiss Cases with Prejudice United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988),
79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (1988); Martha L. Wood, Determination of Dismissal
Sanctions Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 509 (1987).
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The Legal Academy, Defense, and Prosecution

Although there is an institutional inertia pulling courts away from the
STA’s requirements, there are ways to ensure that the criminal justice
system is protecting the public’s interest by enforcing the STA as
Congress intended.
The legal academy could help solve the problem associated with STA
noncompliance by actually calling attention to it. The academy could
conduct empirical studies on pretrial delays in various districts. In
particular, academics could conduct a study comparing a district court
in, say, the Seventh Circuit, which takes a lax approach to enforcing the
STA, 206 to a district court in the Tenth Circuit, which takes a more textbased approach to interpreting the STA 207 Such a study could perhaps
convince circuit courts that their interpretations of the STA create realworld effects in the form of pretrial delays. Other studies could reveal
the average length of delay in criminal cases in various federal districts.
In addition, the academy could address the many areas where courts
effectively disregard the STA, including those areas not covered by this
Article.
While prosecutors play no particular role in ensuring that courts
comply with the STA, if the STA’s requirements are not met, the
prosecution suffers the consequences when an indictment is dismissed.
Moreover, where a prosecutor has played a role in the violation, the
court must consider that information when determining whether to grant
a dismissal with prejudice. 208 In many of the cases discussed above, the
prosecution either contributed to the delay or argued for a result contrary
to the STA’s plain language or to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Act. 209 Prosecutors must begin to act as guardians of the STA and
206. See United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 947 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
133 S. Ct. 1581 (2013).
207. See United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
208. United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Hastings,
847 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir. 1988)).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2012) (“For its waiver
argument, the government advances the novel theory that the failure to raise a pre-indictment delay
objection prior to the return of the indictment constitutes a waiver of that claim.” (quotation
omitted)); United States v. Ferguson, 574 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that
government argued for waiver of STA rights and failed to provide evidence for why it needed an
ends-of-justice continuance); United States v. Jarzembowski, No. 07-122, 2007 WL 2407275, at *3
n.1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2007) (“The court is aware that the government has in other cases taken the
route of seeking to have a Magistrate Judge enter a nunc pro tunc order excluding time in the ends
of justice in an attempt to cure Speedy Trial Act violations resulting from similar waivers to those
filed in this case. The government should be advised that should the court be presented with the
issue in an appropriate case in the future, it will be constrained to find such nunc pro tunc orders as
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conduct themselves in accordance with their unique obligation to protect
the public interest.
Prosecutors can protect the public interest primarily by ensuring that
the STA is followed. Specifically, prosecutors should: 1) limit the
number of pretrial continuances they request; 2) argue for courts to
seriously evaluate any continuance request made by defense counsel;
and 3) ask courts to place their ends-of-justice findings on the record, so
that appellate courts possess an adequate record to review in deciding
whether the public interest was best served by the trial court granting a
continuance. By following the procedures Congress intended,
prosecutors can reduce pretrial delays, thus protecting the public interest
entrusted to their office.
It is safe to say that many of the deficiencies in STA application lay at
the feet of the defense. Defense attorneys should start by familiarizing
themselves with the STA, for it should not be the case that defense
attorneys continue to file waivers of STA rights seven years after the
Court unanimously declared that the STA is unwaivable. 210
Defense attorneys also need to understand that delays can negatively
impact their client’s case and potential sentence. Exculpatory witnesses
and police records, for example, can be lost through the passage of
time. 211 In addition, when defense lawyers create delays between the
time the offense occurred and the time the defendant is sentenced,
criminal defendants will sometimes face a longer sentence than they
would have otherwise faced without the delays. 212 This result occurs
when the U.S. Sentencing Commission occasionally amends the U.S.
Sentencing Guideline range for a particular offense in between a
defendant’s indictment and sentence.213 Given these potential harmful
consequences, defense counsel should file for continuances only when
necessary, and in doing so, defense counsel must request that courts
provide a specific end date for all continuances, lest one continuance
lead to years of delays. 214
invalid as the initial waivers.”).
210. See United States v. Qureshi, No. 09-CR-0102-CVE, 2009 WL 3104042 (N.D. Okla. Sept.
21, 2009); supra Part III.
211. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 31, 38 (1970).
212. See Peugh v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (2013) (finding that a
sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect
at the time of sentencing, rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, to increase a
defendant’s guideline range).
213. See Proposed Amendments to the Guidelines Manual, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/amendments-guidelines-manual (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
214. It should be noted, however, that there is one instance where defense-caused delays may
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In terms of advocacy the defense bar has come up short. A quick
perusal of the briefs filed in some of the cases examined above shows
that STA issues are treated as afterthoughts on appeal. Even when those
issues are litigated with some depth, many attorneys fail to argue for a
faithful application of the Act’s text supported by the enormous body of
legislative history that Congress produced in passing the STA. Also,
many of the circuit conflicts involving the STA have not been—but
should be—appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution, because
that Court, unlike the lower courts, has staunchly interpreted the Act
according to its text and purposes. In sum, defense counsel has an
obligation to understand the STA, to enforce clients’ rights under the
STA at all levels of the judiciary, and not to delay trial for convenience
reasons unrelated—and possibly detrimental—to the client’s best
interests.
C.

District Courts

District courts can comply with the Act’s requirements without
exerting a significant amount of extra effort. First, when deciding
whether to grant a continuance, courts need to inquire into the reasons
the continuance is being requested. If district courts start conducting a
more searching review of continuance motions, that approach would
require the parties to provide more “extensive and specific information
about the need for a continuance,” 215 which could inhibit routine filings
based on questionable motives. Courts, moreover, should treat ends-ofjustice continuances as the exception, not the norm.
Second, in determining the need for delay, a district court must give
significant weight to the public’s interest in a speedy trial, which is
generally served by strict adherence to the STA’s requirements. 216 That
strict adherence requires a court to place its reasons for granting an endsof-justice continuance on the record. And this procedure need not
consume the court’s time—the court can create a record in a few
sentences at a continuance hearing, so long as it is clear that the court
considered the factors contained in the STA. Or, if the court is so
inclined, it can provide a written record explaining why it granted an
ends-of-justice continuance.

work to benefit the defendant: when the defendant is released on bond and has a chance to exhibit
post-conviction rehabilitation prior to sentencing.
215. Qureshi, 2009 WL 3104042, at *1 (rejecting continuance due to defense counsel scheduling
conflict).
216. See United States v. Toombs, 547 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2009).
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One district court in particular has exemplified strict adherence to the
STA. In granting or denying a motion for an ends-of-justice continuance,
District Judge Claire V. Eagan of the Northern District of Oklahoma
provides a written record of her decision-making. In one case, Judge
Eagan concluded that delays in discovery and the need to locate relevant
defense witnesses justified a continuance. 217 In another case, Judge
Eagan found that requiring defendant to stand trial for speedy trial
“would deny him the opportunity to prepare for trial and could impair
his ability to assist in his own defense due to his physical condition.” 218
Judge Eagan, therefore, granted a “limited ends of justice
continuance . . . necessary to ensure that defendant is physically capable
of standing trial and assisting in his defense.” 219 But in a third case,
Judge Eagan found defense counsel’s need for a continuance wanting, in
light of the significant public interest implicated by speedy trials.220
While such a detailed record is not necessary in every case, Judge
Eagan’s approach in these cases is surely the best practice for complying
with the STA’s commands. 221
Third, district court judges should provide their ends-of-justice
findings contemporaneously with the granting of continuances. A court,
for example, could provide a few sentences explaining the reasons for
granting the continuance in its minute orders. By employing this
procedure, courts can ensure that ends-of-justice findings are not made
after the fact, preventing another trial court from having to infer findings
in circumstances where the case has changed robes. Courts also would
be well advised to place these procedures into their local rules to ensure
consistent compliance within the district. 222
D.

Circuit Courts
Circuit courts simply need to better police trial courts by reversing

217. United States v. Carvajal-Mora, No. 08-CR-0059-CVE, 2008 WL 2079454, at *1 (N.D.
Okla. May 15, 2008).
218. United States v. Gregory, No. 08-CR-0125-CVE, 2008 WL 4601573, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Oct.
16, 2008).
219. Id.
220. Qureshi, 2009 WL 3104042, at *2.
221. It comes as no surprise that judges located in the Tenth Circuit take a serious approach to
enforcing the Act as written. The Tenth Circuit has strictly interpreted the Act and, unlike other
circuits, has not added judicial gloss to the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198,
1206–07 (10th Cir. 2010); Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1271.
222. See Greg Ostfeld, Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of Open-Ended “Endsof-Justice” Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (1997).
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convictions—no matter how painful—that fail to follow the procedures
outlined in the Act. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have done an
admirable job of interpreting the Act as written.223 And it is important to
note that those courts have not witnessed their federal districts drown in
STA procedure. Rather, district court judges, such as Judge Eagan, have
faithfully followed the Act as written even where to do so requires
additional written orders. 224
Many of the circuits have open questions regarding STA issues such
as judicial estoppel, IAC, and whether explicit ends-of-justice findings
are required. The Supreme Court has indicated that lower courts must be
vigilant in enforcing the statute as intended, regardless of whether
faithful application leads to reversal of convictions. And, as this article
argues, courts can apply the Act as Congress intended without
needlessly burdening federal district courts and sacrificing judicial
economy.
E.

The U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court needs to reign in circuit courts that either
disregard the Act’s text and purposes or impermissibly add to the Act’s
text. The Court might even need to hand down a strongly worded
opinion, given that lower courts continue to disregard the Court’s
decisions interpreting the Act.
In particular, the Court should address the ends-of-justice provision
because the circuits are divided on what constitutes proper on-the-record
reasons and on the issue of open-ended continuances. 225 These two
circuit conflicts would seem to merit the Court’s attention because the
ends-of-justice provision is one of the most frequently used STA
provisions and because circuit conflicts affecting a large number of cases
are generally considered important federal questions for the Court to
review. 226 And without review, there is a real danger that lower courts
will continue to ignore the procedural protections contained in
§ 3161(h)(7)(A)—what Congress labeled the “heart” of the STA. 227
The Court also could resolve some STA issues through the device of
223. Larson, 627 F.3d at 1206–07; United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 n.2 (9th Cir.
2010); Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1271; United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 1997).
224. United States v. Carvajal-Mora, No. 08-CR-0059-CVE, 2008 WL 2079454, at *1 n.1 (N.D.
Okla. May 15, 2008); Gregory, 2008 WL 4601573.
225. See Ostfeld, supra note 222, at 1038 n.5; J. Andrew Read, Open-Ended Continuances: An
End Run Around The Speedy Trial Act, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 733, 736–37 (1997).
226. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
227. S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 39 (1974).
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summary reversal rather than consuming the Court’s precious plenary
review resources. 228 For example, prime candidates for summary
reversal are the Sixth Circuit’s decisions holding that in order to prevail
on the basis of an STA violation “a defendant must show ‘actual
prejudice.’” 229 Such a holding runs headfirst into the Zedner Court’s
view that harmless-error review is inapplicable with regard to a district
court’s failure to make ends-of-justice on-the-record findings. 230 It is
also contrary to the STA’s text, which says that a trial not commencing
within the seventy-day period “shall be dismissed” without the need for
defendants to establish actual prejudice. 231
CONCLUSION
For the past fifteen years lower federal courts have diluted the STA’s
requirements, resulting in considerable delays between criminal
defendants’ arraignments and trials. As Congress has explicitly found,
justice delayed is not only justice denied but also justice at a higher
price. Such delays were once tolerated, but in enacting the STA,
Congress sought to cure the disease of delayed justice.
The Act can only reduce those delays if the criminal justice system as
a whole begins to staunchly follow the Act’s provisions. To begin with,
the Academy must evaluate delays between indictment and trial, and
then bring it to the attention of both federal courts and practitioners.
Prosecutors must move to uphold the STA, even where courts are
willing to forego its procedures. Defense lawyers, in turn, must only
request delays where such a move complies with the Act and benefits
their clients. Finally, federal courts must faithfully follow and interpret
the Act according to what Congress intended, even where it would
require the court to reverse a conviction and even where it would force
courts to make additional findings. If these actors within the criminal
justice system are dedicated to upholding the STA as written, criminal
defendants, and the public alike, will benefit.

228. Kevin Russell, An Increase in the Court’s Summary Docket, SCOTUSBLOG, (Feb. 16, 2010,
11:03
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/an-increase-in-the-court’s-summary-docket/
(“Summary reversals tend to be directed at correcting an error in a particular case, rather than
resolving circuit conflicts or establishing general principles of law, which is what the Supreme
Court spends the vast majority of its time doing in its typical argued cases.”).
229. United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing and quoting United States
v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 718 (6th Cir. 2007)).
230. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2012).

